Building your startup on a dominant fast growing platform can be very alluring to entrepreneurs. In some cases it can be pretty smart. Here are a couple of good examples: Citrix (windows platform) and Virsa (SAP). I generally think leveraging fast growing platforms to acquire customers is a winning idea. Ask Youtube which can thank myspace for its initial growth. Samething for paypal with ebay. But I think one has to be very careful when you bet your sucess and life on someone else’s platform, particularly if that platform is new and evolving. I made this mistake with one of my companies that bet on Java3D (a java extension API for 3D grapics). Java3D was a very appealing idea (write once and run everywhere for graphics and games) but it never quite fulfilled the promise which hampered our product adoption.
There are several startups that are betting their fortunes on platfroms such as facebook, twitter and iphone etc. The attractive thing about these platforms is that you can build interesting things with small teams (since you are only building apps that live inside these platforms as opposed to standalone products) and gain huge viral distribution. But it is a slippery slope as many are finding out. These platforms are still evolving and they themselves haven’t started making too much money. Also they are still trying to fugure out what they want to own and what to leave for others. This is the bitter lesson learnt by once high flying social music startup iLike. Gawker chronicles their journey from a VC darling to a fire sale item.
Two years ago, music service iLike appeared to be set: Its CEO said it was “made,” its investor mused it could be a “billion-dollar winner,” and the press was enthralled. Now the poster child is a cautionary tale.
iLike became something of an icon for a certain class of startup: Built on social networks, fast-growing, unprofitable, advertising supported. The company’s impending sale to MySpace at a fire-sale price could hardly be a bigger wakeup call to these fellow makers of software “widgets.”
The company was once valued at $53 million, back when Ticketmaster bought a 25 percent stake in late 2006, according to the Seattle Times. iLike amassed a total of $17 million from Ticketmaster and other investors like Silicon Valley venture capitalist Vinod Khosla and former AOL exec Bob Pittman. Now it’s negotiating to sell for just $19.5 million, All Things D reports, and $6 million of that is contingent on retaining certain employees in coming months.
It’s quite comedown. But it’s easy to see how iLike became a media darling and a hero to other makers of widgets. In the late spring of 2007, iLike ported its music recommendation service to Facebook, and in the process spiked its user base dramatically, to 15 million from 3 million over six months. In one week just after the Facebook launch, four venture capitalists asked CEO Ali Partovi (pictured) to lunch, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported; the company reportedly added close to 200 servers over the course of the summer.
There are some very important lessons in this iLike saga for all these startups that only live inside of these platform ecosystems. It is very difficult to build multi billion dollar companies on top of someone else’s platform. I am surprised at how even top VCs get carried away sometimes.
PS: I am not saying that you can not build successful businesses on these platforms. Just don’t look for huge IPO potential companies if you are a facebook, twitter or iphone apps company. Companies such as Zynga and Offerpal are smart in not betting on any one site/platform but built services for a network of platforms. This spread their risk and increases their scope. They are betting on social phenomenon not one partuclar player. That is a much better approach in my book.
MySpace is close to acquiring popular social music service 
